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Abstract—Security in the Internet has historically been added
post-hoc, leaving services like email, which, after all, is used
by 3.7 billion users, vulnerable to large-scale surveillance. For
email alone, there is a multitude of proposals to mitigate known
vulnerabilities, ranging from the introduction of completely
new protocols to modifications of the communication paths
used by big providers [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. Deciding
which measures to deploy requires a deep understanding of
the induced benefits, the cost and the resulting effects.
This paper proposes the first automated methodology
for making formal deployment assessments. Our planning
algorithm analyses the impact and cost-efficiency of different
known mitigation strategies against an attacker in a formal
threat model. This novel formalisation of an infrastructure
attacker includes routing, name resolution and application level
weaknesses. We apply the methodology to a large-scale scan
of the Internet, and assess how protocols like IPsec, DNSSEC,
DANE, SMTP STS, SMTP over TLS and other mitigation
techniques like server relocation can be combined to improve
the confidentiality of email users in 45 combinations of attacker
and defender countries and nine cost scenarios. This is the first
deployment analysis for mitigation techniques at this scale.
1. Introduction
The Internet infrastructure relies on the correct function-
ing of the basic underlying protocols for routing and name
resolution, which, historically, were designed for function-
ality, not for security. Over the past decades, the security
research community has put a lot of effort into strengthening
the security of these protocols by applying cryptographic
means on various layers of communication (e.g., IPsec,
DNSSEC, TLS). But only a small fraction of them have
been deployed and have a real-world impact. Is inertia the
only reason that this is the case? For email alone, there are
a multitude of proposals to mitigate known vulnerabilities,
ranging from the introduction of completely new protocols
to modifications of the communication paths used by big
providers [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. At the very core,
every meaningful decision about which measure to deploy
calls for a deep and rigorous understanding of the induced
benefits, the cost and the resulting effects.
In this work, we provide a thorough and automated
methodology for making formal deployment assessments for
various layers of the email infrastructure. We propose such
a methodology in the form of a mitigation analysis. Our
methodology models and analyses the impact of different
mitigation strategies against an attacker as a game with a
single exchange of action and counter-action, similar to a
Stackelberg game. Such a mitigation analysis was recently
proposed for corporate networks, where the number of hosts
is in the hundreds [8]. Here, we adapt the model and analysis
to Internet infrastructure attack mitigation, over a dataset
spanning more than 6 million domains, IPs, autonomous
systems and DNS-zones. Given the scale of the data set, the
computational challenge is tremendous, as the best attacker
strategy needs to be considered for every combination of
mitigation choices on the part of the defender. Tackling this
complexity is where security meets AI: following Speicher
et al. [8], we employ AI planning methods for effective
search in mitigation-choice space, geared at finding good
choices quickly and pruning later choices against the bounds
thus identified. Finally, the outcome of the mitigation anal-
ysis is the Pareto frontier of mitigation strategies, i.e., the
optimal choice of mitigation efforts per budget. In practice,
this provides a function from a given budget to the set of
most effective mitigation strategies. Such an assessment is
useful (a) for standardisation bodies to estimate the potential
improvement of the adoption of a new security standard,
(b) for government bodies to evaluate strategies for digital
self-reliance, (c) for protocol designers to guide and evaluate
their decisions w.r.t. the current infrastructure, and (d) for
providers to make investment decisions on their infrastruc-
ture.
We demonstrate our methodology at scale in a case study
where we take the high-level perspective of a government
body seeking to secure its Internet infrastructure. In partic-
ular, we focus on the case of email, which is used by 3.7
billion users worldwide [9]. Since the Snowden revelations
have unfolded, governments and the citizens they represent
are aware of large-scale spying programs targeting ‘nearly
everything a typical user does on the Internet’ [10].
This is achieved by deep packet inspection
(XKEYSCORE [10]) and the cooperation of large
American providers (PRISM [11]).
Many governments realize the threat this poses for na-
tional security [12], but also for trade secrets [13] and
human rights [14], and have lately responded by creating
various forms of organisations, most often military entities,
that deal exclusively with security from cyber-attacks [15],
[16]. Given publicly available information and ballpark cost
estimates for mitigations, we assess the cost and impact
of mitigations in nine cost scenarios and 45 combinations
of defender and attacker countries. Our results suggest a
nuanced view. There is no single cure for all, viable mitiga-
tion strategies differ from country to country and scenario
to scenario. Some might consider the idea of a country
feeling responsible for the privacy of its citizen’s emails an
overly idealistic view. However, given that countries under
the jurisdiction of the European court of human rights are
bound to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, articles 6, 8 and 10 of which
were found to be ‘endangered’ by ‘mass surveillance and
large-scale intrusion practices’ [14], this goal is arguably
a core responsibility of a constitutional government: the
enforcement of basic constitutional human rights.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
– We present a comprehensive deployment cost estimation
methodology, reasoning about the cost versus the efficacy
of different mitigation strategies (Section 2).
– We present a novel, formal threat model covering attacks
on the routing level, name resolution and email commu-
nication (Section 3).
– We formalize the effects and estimate the cost of pro-
posals like IPsec, DNSSEC, DANE, SMTP STS and
SMTP over TLS (SMTPS), yielding a defender model
composed of mitigation strategies for minimizing the
attacker’s objective (Section 4).
– We apply our methodology on the German email infras-
tructure in face of large-scale email sniffing and discuss
different cost scenarios (Section 6.2), and 45 combina-
tions of attacker and defender countries (Section 6.3).
– Here, we identify viable mitigation strategies in different
scenarios, as well as strategies that are only rarely worth
the effort, while also highlighting deployment issues of
existing approaches and their limits in face of foreign
infrastructure.
Limitations. Our analysis relies on (i) a formal threat
model and (ii) a formal defender model. Our threat model
assumes the protocols covered here to work as intended;
even if this is the case, as of now there is no formal
justification for it to be sound and complete, e.g., w.r.t.
a Dolev-Yao attacker and a correct implementation of the
respective protocols. As we compare attacks by their ef-
fectiveness, both soundness and completeness are required.
Our defender-model depends on a realistic cost assessment.
Given the scope of this paper, we can provide only a
rudimentary analysis that sacrifices precision for uniformity
and clarity. We made an effort to provide sources for our cost
assessment where possible, but point out that (a) cost vary
from company to company and often depend on company
secrets (b) our cost model includes only direct monetary cost
(c) we do not quantify the margin of error of our results.
2. Planning
Our mitigation analysis is based on Automated Planning,
one of the oldest sub-areas of AI (see [17] for a compre-
hensive introduction). Given a high-level description of the
relevant world properties consisting of state propositions,
initial state, a goal specification, and a set of actions that
can be used to alter the state of the world, the basic prin-
ciple behind automated planning is to find a combination
of actions that achieve the goal condition when applied
in the initial state. Different forms of planning are distin-
guished by their modeling assumptions, which determine the
complexity class that typical questions, e.g., existence of a
plan, fall into. In the following, we will focus entirely on
classical planning, where it is assumed that all actions have
deterministic effects, and that the initial state is completely
known, up front – both being reasonable assumptions in our
model.
Planning has been used in a range of application as
diverse as the control of modular printers [18], natural
language sentence generation [19][20], greenhouse logistics
[21] and, in particular, network security penetration testing
[22], [23][24], [25], [26]. This latter branch of research –
network attack planning as a tool for automated security
testing – has been called simulated pentesting. We adopt
this approach here to our context.
2.1. Mitigation analysis
Mitigation analysis through planning has been proposed
recently in the context of network penetration testing [8]
and can be seen as a two-fold planning task, in which a
defender plans for mitigation strategies that impose a limit
on the worst any attacker can do.
Formally, the state of the world and the state of an
attack are described through a finite set of propositions.
A state is a truth value assignment to these propositions.
Concrete attacks depend on the initial world state and are
determined from a finite set of attacker actions. Associated
with an attack is the attacker reward R, which is used as
an indicator of the severity of the attack. For example, as
shown in Section 3.1, in our model the reward of an attack
corresponds to the number of connections that could be
compromised via the attack. To prevent attacks and thus
to lower the attacker reward, the defender can change the
world state through the application of defender actions.
In logical terms, an action is given by a precondition
pre, a boolean formula over proposition literals and a post-
condition post, a conjunction over proposition literals, and
is written as
pre
post.
1) Reward = 0.217100, Cost = $0
∅
2) Reward = 0.161200, Cost = $366 342
¬nDNSSEC(mail.ru)
.
.
.
15) Reward = 0.010400, Cost = $168 372 779
¬nDNSSEC(rambler.ru), ¬nDNSSEC(mail.ru), ¬nDNSSEC(yandex.ru),
¬nReloc(gmail.com), ¬nRFC7817(yandex.ru), ¬nRFC7817(mail.ru)
16) Reward = 0.000000, Cost = $186 404 888
¬nDNSSEC(rambler.ru), ¬nDNSSEC(mail.ru), ¬nDNSSEC(yandex.ru),
¬nReloc(gmail.com), ¬nRFC7817(yandex.ru), ¬nRFC7817(rambler.ru),
¬nRFC7817(mail.ru) 
Figure 1: Excerpt of the Pareto frontier from USA vs.
Russia.
An action may only be applied in states that satisfy
the action’s precondition. In the state resulting from this
application, all propositions with positive occurrence in
post are made true, and vice versa, all propositions with
negative occurrence in post are made false. Additionally,
every defender action is associated with a positive real cost
value.
In the concrete attacker-planning model that we de-
rive from our dataset (detailed in Section 3), we employ
monotonic attacker actions, with positive preconditions and
postconditions only (no negated literals). This corresponds
to a wide-spread assumption in automated attack analysis,
specifically attack analysis via attack graphs (e.g. [27][28],
[29], [30]): during the course of a given attack, the attacker
incrementally gains new assets, but never loses any assets
(we will discuss the attack graph literature in more detail
in Section 7). In other words, in our mitigation analysis,
the defender gets to move first, and the subsequent move of
the attacker is carried out without additional interference on
the part of the defense. Planning with monotonic actions is
polynomial-time while planning with general action models
is PSPACE-complete [31].
We compare different mitigation strategies, i.e., se-
quences σ of defender actions, in terms of their cost c(σ):
the sum of the cost of the defender actions in the sequence;
and the impact on attacks R(σ): the attacker reward in
the state resulting from the application of σ. We say that
a mitigation strategy dominates, ‘is better than’, another
mitigation strategy if its cost is strictly smaller while the
attacker reward is not larger, or if the maximal attacker
reward is strictly smaller while the cost is not larger, i.e.,
either R(σ) ≤ R(σ′) and c(σ) < c(σ′), or R(σ) < R(σ′)
and c(σ) ≤ c(σ′). Our analysis yields the Pareto frontier
P of mitigation strategies: the set of mitigation strategies
which are not dominated by any other mitigation strategy.
Figure 1 gives an example of a Pareto frontier output by
our analysis tool, the details of which will become clear in
Section 6.
2.2. Planning algorithm
To compute the Pareto frontier, we extend the algorithm
proposed for network penetration testing [8] to our setting.
In its basic principle, the algorithm tests and compares all
mitigation strategies against each other in order to find the
non-dominated ones. However, naı¨vely comparing all possi-
ble mitigation strategies is infeasible even for small models.
The overall number of mitigation strategies that have to be
compared is exponential in the number of defender actions.
To scale to larger and hence more interesting models from
a practical perspective, Speicher et al. [8] proposed several
pruning techniques to skip mitigation options which are
irrelevant or inefficient considering the current network state
and the mitigations considered so far. In doing so, it was
possible to analyze networks of up to about 1 000 hosts
in their evaluation. We adopt these techniques in our work,
but even with these optimizations, analyzing data at Internet
scale would be far beyond the scope of the algorithm. To
make it feasible to run this mitigation analysis approach on
our model, we identify parts that are relevant for neither the
attacker nor for the defender, and that can thus be removed
prior to the analysis. The identification of irrelevant parts
here is based on the concept of property graphs.
2.3. Property Graph
A basic input to our planning model machinery is the
property graph, a labeled graph introduced by Simeonovski
et al. [32]. Nodes in this graph represent IP addresses, do-
main names, Autonomous Systems (AS, a group of routers
whose addresses and routing polices are under common
administrative control) and countries; edges represent rela-
tionships between them.
We extend the graph formalism from prior work with
AS-level routes and an indication of DNS resolvers used.
The AS-level routes indicate the ASes that a packet traverses
when transmitted from source to destination. These are
directed, as routes are not always symmetrical. The resolver,
or local DNS resolver, is the last recursive name server that
performs iterative domain resolution. We will explain how
the DNS resolver is identified and the routing data collected
in Section 5.
Figure 2 presents a snippet of the property graph. Nodes
in the set Dom indicate domain names, e.g., gmail.com
with a DNS record A mapping the IP addresses (nodes in
the set IP), e.g., 216.58.207.37, which in turn belongs to
an AS (AS15169) and is geolocated in the US. A directed
first-order edge RTE(AS t) (AS t is a property of this edge)
indicates that there is some route from the source AS to the
destination AS which traverses AS t.
For instance, in our example the edge labels show
that AS 1 to ASn might be traversed if a user using
gmail.com sends an email to t-online.de. The set of
labels {AS 1, . . . ,ASn} is the union of ASes that appear in
some route, but not a route itself, as we only need data at this
granularity. The graph does not include peering agreements
between ASes. Given these agreements and each AS’es
routing policy, these routing edges can be computed; we
choose to probe routes used instead. Table 1 summarizes
the types of nodes and edges which we consider in our
model. The threat model described in the next section is
formulated in terms of rules with predicates of form a B−→ c
or a ∈ S for the existence of labeled edges and node types
in the property graph.
gmail.com
gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com
64.233.167.26
US
216.58.207.37
AS15169
173.194.95.140 ns1.google.com
t-online.de
62.153.158.62 62.138.238.100
AS3320 DE
mx00.t-online.de
RTE(AS 1)...
RTE(ASn)
NSMX MXA
A
A
LOC
LOC
ORIG
ORIG
ORIG
RSLVR RSLVR
Figure 2: Snippet of the property graph
node/edge description
IP IP address.
Dom domain name.
AS IANA number assigned to the AS.
Cntry country code.
ORIG AS where an lhs originates from.
LOC country where lhs (IP ∪ Dom ∪ AS) is located.
DNS resolving lhs domain requires query to rhs.
RSLVR lhs uses resolver on rhs for name resolution.
A DNS record mapping Dom to IP.
MX DNS record mapping Dom for email delivery.
RTE(AS t) AS-level route via AS t between two ASes.
TABLE 1: Labels of nodes and relationships
2.4. Precomputation
Our analysis determines the relevant part of the graph
by combining a tainting similar to the approach proposed by
Simeonovski et al. [32] with a reversed tainting starting from
the mail providers. Only nodes tainted from both directions
need to be considered, significantly reducing the size of
the graph relevant for the analysis. More precisely: given
the full graph, all attacker rules are applied until a fixed
point is reached. These are monotonous, i.e., the order in
which they are applied is unimportant (cf. Section 3). All
nodes and edges appearing in any instantiation of a rule
that was applied are ‘forward tainted’. For any provider that
was forward tainted, we proceed in the opposite direction,
using only actions that were applied in the forward tainting.
Interpreting them backward, we again apply them until a
fixed point is reached. Nodes and edges appearing in these
actions are now forward and backward tainted and define
the relevant sub graph of the problem.
3. Threat Model
Since the Snowden revelations have unfolded, govern-
ments are aware of and react to large-scale spying pro-
grams targeting ‘nearly everything a typical user does on
the Internet’ via deep packet inspection and cooperation of
domestic companies [10]. Hence our threat model considers
an infrastructure attacker who is able to use routing and
DNS spoofing to mount attacks which are not specific to
implementation vulnerabilities or protocol weaknesses of
SMTP, but concern the underlying assumptions on routing
and domain resolutions that the security of protocols without
endpoint verification, such as SMTP, rely on. Furthermore,
the attacking country has the means to compromise servers
located in her jurisdiction, e.g., using gag orders or leg-
islature, and to observe and intercept packets routed via
ASes under her jurisdiction. The goal of the attacker is
large-scale surveillance, hence the attacker is active, but
restricted to easy-too-mount attacks which scale well and
avoid global exposure. For this reason, we do not consider
off-path attacks on DNS [33] or false BGP announcements.
In contrast to formal protocol verification, our threat
model considers the combination of known attack vectors
w.r.t. routing, name resolution, and email communication in
a more abstract, attack-centric view. The attacker is not in
full control over the network but can inject packets at certain
routes.
We ignore client-specific defense measures such as end-
to-end encryption because they are rarely used. PGP, ar-
guably the most prevalent of those, has never gained enough
traction to prevent large-scale attacks: currently 4.7M keys
are within the SKS keypool [34], and much less are part of
a strongly connected set [35].
3.1. Attacker reward
The goal of the attacker is to observe as much of the
defender country’s email communication as possible. Instead
of counting the number of mail domains the adversary can
gain control of, we estimate the impact in terms of users
affected based on market share data and the total number of
Internet users in the defending country. Not only does this
provide us with a meaningful impact metric, but it facilitates
the analysis, as in most countries email is a market with
very few players. We represent those as a set of domains
Provider ⊆ Dom and consider only providers for which
market share data is available. The ability to intercept emails
from provider A to provider B is represented by a predicate
unconf(A,B). The attacker optimises the number distinct
tuples A,B, weighted by their respective share of commu-
nication ω(A,B), which is the product of the market share
of A and B: R = max∑d,e∈Provider s.t. unconf(d,e) ω(d, e)1.
3.2. Attacker actions
We formalize the threat model as a set of attack rules,
which, when instantiated with all domains, countries, ASes,
IPs, etc. give us a large but finite set of attacker actions. All
attacks we present here are well known, the contribution of
this section is limited to their formalisation.
We distinguish between domains, IPs or ASes that ini-
tially belong to the adversary, domains that do not belong
1. A concrete interpretation can be given as follows: if every email user
in the defending country sends an email to every other user (technically
including himself, but the error is negligible), the rewards equals the
percentage of emails the attacker can read.
to the adversary, but can be resolved to adversarial IPs, and
MXes which can be resolved to adversarial domains. This
corresponds to direct (initial) compromise in the real-world,
compromise on the DNS layer, and compromise on the
application layer, i.e., mail (which relies on DNS). Similarly,
we distinguish between compromise of communication on
the routing, DNS, and application layer. Table 2 gives an
overview of the predicates we use in our modelling.
C(x) Node x ∈ Dom ∪ IP ∪ AS ∪ Cntry under
adversarial control.
IDNS(d) Integrity of name resolution of d ∈ Dom
compromised
IR(d, e) Integrity of some route from d ∈ Dom to
e ∈ Dom is compromised.
IDNS(d, e) Integrity of name resolution of e ∈ Dom
from perspective of d ∈ Dom compromised.
unconf(d, e) email communication going from some user
of d ∈ Provider to some user of e ∈
Provider is considered unconfidential.
nDNSSEC(d) d ∈ Dom does not support DNSSEC.
nTLSsnd(d) d ∈ Dom does not enforce strict host valida-
tion when sending emails.
nVPN(a, b) communication between a, b ∈ AS is not
secured with IPsec.
nDANErcv(d) d ∈ Dom does not support DANE.
nRFC7817(d) d ∈ Dom does not validate the receiving
server’s domain part of the email address
according to RFC 7817 [36] when sending
emails.
TABLE 2: Integrity and confidentiality impact predicates.
3.2.1. Initially Compromised Nodes. The attacker starts
with a set of nodes considered compromised initially,
namely ASes, IPs and domains located in the attacking
country.
x ∈ AS ∪ IP ∪ Dom cn ∈ Cntry x LOC−−→ n C(cn)
C(x)
An IP is also considered compromised if it belongs to an at-
tacking country or a compromised AS. If a domain resolves
to such an IP, this domain is considered compromised, too.
i∈IP a∈AS i ORIG−−−→a C(a)
C(i)
d∈Dom i∈IP d A−→i C(i)
C(d)
Whether or not a server is part of a given jurisdiction
is an ongoing debate [37], and subject to the attacker’s
legal system. We side-step all these juridical nuances; policy
makers should explicitly state all compromised domains,
ASes and IPs based on an actual legal assessment. Whether
or not a server is part of a given jurisdiction is subject to the
attacker’s legal system and out of the scope of this work;
we side-step this question by assuming jurisdiction to equal
geographical location. Policy makers should explicitly state
all compromised domains, ASes, and IPs based on an actual
legal assessment.
3.2.2. Attacks via Routing. Next, we consider routing at-
tacks at the AS level. Each IP is part of an AS. An IP packet
may traverse several AS on the way from source AS to target
AS. If any of these is compromised, this route is considered
compromised. Note that complete information about the
set of routes a packet takes depends on private contracts
between ASes implemented via custom routing policies.
Furthermore, the routing changes dynamically, e.g, when
contracts foresee quotas. We approximate these routes using
measurements from the RIPE database (see Section 5).
d,e∈Dom i,j∈IP a,b,c∈AS C(b) nVPN(a,c)
d
A−→i e A−→j i ORIG−−−→a j ORIG−−−→c a RTE(b)−−−−→c
IR(d, e)
Routing level mitigations presented in the next section con-
sider securing the entire communication between two ASes
a and c using IPsec. The absence of this mitigation is repre-
sented via a predicate nVPN(a, c), hence, if this predicate is
true, then the integrity of the communication from d ∈ Dom
to e ∈ Dom must be considered compromised, if there is
some compromised AS b on some (possibly multi-hop) route
from a to c.
3.2.3. Integrity of domain/MX resolution. A domain’s
resolver (i.e., the last recursive name server, c.f. Sec-
tion 5) performs iterative domain resolution whenever it
cannot respond with a cached DNS record. To resolve,
e.g., www.google.com.2, one of the root servers, which
are authoritative for ., is queried and returns the author-
itative name server for com, which is then queried and
returns the authoritative name server for google.com,
which finally responds to the query by providing the IP of
www.google.com. Consequently, if any requested name
server is under adversarial control, the attacker can alter the
requested DNS record in whatever way she likes. Neverthe-
less we restrict the adversary to not compromise the root
servers’ responses, as such an attack would put the DNS
infrastructure as a whole into question, and we assume the
adversary is sneaky. Let d DNS−−→ e be given for any name
server d that could be queried during resolution of domain e.
This would include all root servers, no matter which domain
e is chosen. However, we explicitly exclude those, as such
an attack would put the DNS infrastructure as a whole into
question, and we assume the adversary is sneaky. If there is a
compromised domain potentially queried during resolution,
the whole resolution is seen as compromised.
d, e ∈ Dom d DNS−−→ e C(e)
IDNS(d) (rdns−ns )
If the resolver itself is already under control of the
attacker, then every resolution via this resolver must be seen
as compromised.
d, e ∈ Dom i ∈ IP d RSLVR−−−−→ i C(i)
IDNS(d, e)
2. The terminating ‘.’ is typically omitted by convention.
We also model that the name resolution itself is susceptible
to routing attacks, e.g., via packet injection, and maintain an-
other predicate, IDNS(d, e), formalising a lack of integrity of
the domain resolution of e from the perspective of a domain
d in case that the resolution d performs can be compromised
via packet routing. In Section 4, we will consider DNSSEC,
which mitigates DNS spoofing via packet injection but not
DNS spoofing via compromised authoritative name servers
or a compromised resolver3. Hence we add the precondition
nDNSSEC(e) for e the domain to be resolved.
d,e,f,r∈Dom d RSLVR−−−−→r nDNSSEC(e)
(e
DNS−−→f∧IR(r,f))∨IR(d,r)
IDNS(d, e)
(Remark: we use a disjunction in the precondition for
brevity. This is to be read as two rules, one for each
disjunct.)
3.2.4. Confidentiality. The remaining attacker actions
translate initial compromise and attacks on the routing and
the name resolution to a loss of confidentiality on the proto-
col level. A peculiarity of the SMTP protocol is that emails
are not delivered to the domain indicated by the email, but
to the MX entry for this domain, i.e., a domain, which in
turn is resolved to an IP[38]. This dependence of application
level features from name resolution has undesired effects on
certificate validation, as we will see.
If a mail server is initially compromised, all connections
to or from it are considered unconfidential immediately.
d, e ∈ Provider d MX−−→ d′ e MX−−→ e′ C(e′) ∨ C(d′)
unconf(d, e)
If the integrity of the name resolution of an MX is com-
promised, TLS may preserve the confidentiality of com-
munication by validating the certificate of the recipient.
However, this requires the recipient to support TLS (which
was the case for all mail providers we considered), and the
sender to terminate TLS connections if the recipient’s TLS
certificate does not validate for the MX’s host name (which
rarely happens). It is a known weakness of the STARTTLS
mechanism for securing SMTP connections that an active
adversary can intercept and silently drop the attempt to
elevate the connection to STARTTLS, in which case its
fallback mechanism to unencrypted SMTP results in a loss
of confidentiality. Despite being an active attack, it scales
well and is in fact used for mass surveillance, e.g., in
Thailand [39]. Similarly, SMTP over TLS (SMTPS) remains
insecure if the sender falls back to unencrypted SMTP if the
connection to the receiver on port 465 fails. Consequently, in
our model, both approaches are equivalent to no encryption
at all.
All mail providers we considered do not enforce TLS
connections in general, and accept even self-signed cer-
tificates. Hence, they are susceptible to this attack. This
3. We assume that the domain’s resolver is validating and that its
validation is trusted in iterative resolution. This is the most common setup.
is not surprising, considering that the original STARTTLS
proposal considered domain validation a ‘local matter’ [4].
Facebook and Google are aware of this problem, and are
trying to push the use of TLS for emails by investigating
deployment obstacles and, to some extend, by public sham-
ing [40], [41], Still, even some popular domains fail strict
certificate validation [42].
If the sender does not enforce strict host validation, e.g.,
she uses optimistic STARTTLS, the attacker considered in
our threat model can change a provider’s MX record to point
to a domain under her control, point the domain of the MX
to an IP of her choice, or intercept packets on the route
between their respective mail servers.
d,e∈Provider d6=e d MX−−→d′
nTLSsnd(d) IDNS(e)∨IDNS(d′,e)
unconf(d, e)
The predicate nTLSsnd(d), indicating that d does not enforce
strict host validation when sending emails, is initially always
false – currently no mail provider does this, the original
STARTTLS proposal even considered domain validation a
‘local matter’ [4]. Still, some popular domains fail strict
certificate validation [42]. We will consider the cost of
changing the status quo in Section 4. Consequently, the
attacker can modify the IP to which the MX entry (which
is a domain) itself is resolved.
d,e∈Provider d6=e d MX−−→d′ e MX−−→e′
IDNS(e′)∨IDNS(d′,e′) nTLSsnd(d)
unconf(d, e)
Routing attacks also apply to TLS but can be countered by
proper certificate validation, and also by using DANE or
SMTP STS (cf. Section 4).
d,e∈Provider d6=e d MX−−→d′ e MX−−→e′
IR(d′,e′) nTLSsnd(d) nDANErcv(e)
unconf(d, e)
Even enforcing strict domain validation allows an attacker
to intercept emails, as the integrity of the domain name
resolution procedure is required to identify the MX respon-
sible for a mail domain. Most client certificates contain the
domain name of this MX server, but not the mail domain.
Consequently, a connection between two mail domains can
still remain unconfidential, even if TLS is enforced, if the
adversary is able to refer communication to another server
by means of the MX entry. In 2016, the server identity check
procedure was updated with RFC 7817: a valid certificate
now needs to contain the email domain (domain id, the last
part of the email address), as well as the MX domain [36].
This prevents the above attack, hence the attacker action in
our model only applies if the mail provider performs no mail
domain verification according to RFC 7817 (nRFC7817(d)).
None of the mail providers we encountered enforced this
strict validation. hence the predicate nRFC7817(d′) will only
be removed as a result of a possible defender action (see next
section).
d,e∈Provider d6=e d MX−−→d′
IDNS(e)∨IDNS(d′,e) nRFC7817(d)
unconf(d, e)
4. Defender Model
We describe the defender model in terms of defender
actions that can be composed to mitigation strategies to
minimize the attacker’s objective value R. In contrast to
attacker actions, each defender action f is associated with
a cost c(f) ∈ R+0 (the cost from the defender’s point of
view). We estimate this cost based on publicly available
data (our analysis algorithm performs well, cf. Section 6;
state actors with access to detailed information will be
able to refine our cost estimates and obtain more accurate
results). The complete set of defender actions, including
short descriptions, can be found in Appendix B.
4.1. Provenance and role of the defender
We take the view of a state actor adhering to the rule of
law, trying to estimate the cost mitigations would impose on
the companies affected. We assume all companies providing
services to users from the defending country are under this
country’s jurisdiction. Depending on the mitigation, and
the existence or absence of regulatory entities within this
country, mitigations could be implemented by a) recom-
mendations coming from regulatory bodies or government
agencies, b) regulatory standards enforced by such bodies,
or c) laws permitting direct intervention in case of national
security risks. The actual cost of enforcing these mitigations
are not only of monetary, but also of political nature, in-
cluding potential insecurity in long-term investments, addi-
tional administrative costs, necessary political cost and, most
importantly, eventual loss of individual and entrepreneurial
freedom. We concentrate on the economical cost to provide
a result with a clear interpretation.
4.2. Routing mitigations
Routing-level attacks affect both communication and
name resolution. We thus consider securing packets routed
between two ASes via IPSEC [43], [44]. We add a rule
permitting the defender to set the predicate nVPN(a, b) to
false, for any two ASes located on its soil, which prevents
routing attacks as discussed in Section 3.2.2.
a, b ∈ AS a, b LOC−−→ cnD
¬nVPN(a, b) c = $56 000
Cost estimation. Public data on AS-level throughput is
incomplete, but the data we have suggest that the vast ma-
jority of ASes are connected with a link speed of 10Gbit/s,
hence we estimate the cost of providing this throughput at
peak times [45]. The computational requirements are well
understood, two dedicated routers (one for each side) for
$24 000 each are sufficient [46]. Adding about 80 consulting
hours for configuration and testing [47], and annual cost for
support and maintenance [47], we arrive at an estimate of
80 · $100 + $48 000 = $56 000 for the cost of deploying a
VPN connection. We neglect the energy cost, as an existing
router would likely be replaced, and the additional compu-
tational cost is almost exclusively symmetric cryptography,
which is very efficient on these devices.
4.3. DNS-level mitigations
We consider two countermeasures against attacks to
domain resolution: DNSSEC and DANE. DNSSEC was
designed to provide, among other properties, origin authen-
tication and data integrity for DNS data [1], [2], [3]. Let
d
NS−→ e be given for any name server e that is authoritative
for d. DNSSEC mitigates DNS-level attacks that rely on
intercepting packets between a mail provider and its re-
solver or between the resolver and an authoritative name
server. It does not provide protection against authoritative
name servers under adversarial control. As deployment of
DNSSEC on the root servers and the defender countries’
TLDs is completed, this mitigation is available as of now.
We consider the employment cost per company, hence all
servers for which a provider’s name server is authoritative
are mitigated in one step. As a side-effect, mail providers
which are part of the same company share this cost if the
same name server is authoritative for them. Some mail
providers, such as web.de and GMX in Germany, have
already deployed it.
f∈Provider
{d1,...,dl}={d∈Dom|d
DNS−−→e∧f NS−→e}
¬nDNSSEC(d1) ∧ · · · ∧ ¬nDNSSEC(dl) c = $366 342
DNSSEC by itself is only useful against packet injec-
tion attacks on resolution, as any name server consulted
during resolution of a domain is part of the trust chain.
But the integrity it provides can be used to indicate that
the communication partner prefers communication via TLS.
This side-steps the deployment issue that strict certificate
validation in TLS faces. There are two technologies which
can be used to this end, DANE (DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities [5]) and SMTP STS (Strict Transport
Security [6]). Both have different aims and approaches:
SMTP STS allows mail transfer agents (MTA) to publish
their intent to use TLS, e.g., via text records in DNS, while
DANE first and foremost transmits information about which
certificates should be accepted, e.g., by publishing the hash
of the end-to-end certificate. Thus DANE may be used to
indicate that TLS shall be used for mail communication by
providing the certificate’s hash. While DANE can be used to
take over some tasks of the public-key infrastructure (PKI),
in our model the PKI is fully trusted. Hence with respect to
our threat model, both technologies are providing essentially
the same functionality.
f∈Provider
f
NS−→e d DNS−−→e ¬nDNSSEC(d)
¬nDANErcv(f) c = $4 000
Cost estimation. We assume all mail providers have a
DNSSEC-aware resolver, as software is readily available
to this end, and consider only the cost at the receiver’s
side, where the DNS infrastructure needs to be upgraded.
We calculated the cost for deploying DNSSEC based on an
extensive survey [48] among 19 companies about their capi-
tal expenditures (CAPEX) for upgrading their infrastructure
to handle DNSSEC. Email providers are zone operators,
judging from the size of the companies that took part, it
seemed appropriate to the take the maximum CAPEX, which
is C335 590 ($366 342).4 This number might be surprisingly
high, but DNSSEC comes with considerable operational
efforts witnessed, e.g., by the failed key rollover of the .gov
TLD in 2013.
The deployment itself is not a complex task; planning
and implementing should not need more then 40 working
hours. Therefore, we fix the cost for reconfiguration to be
cost = 40 ∗ $100 = $4 000. Our model could be used for a
more nuanced treatment distinguishing the two approaches;
yet whichever has the lowest cost would dominate the other,
as we presume the PKI to be trusted. In other words, some
advantages of DANE over SMTP STS simply do not apply
to our threat model.
4.4. Mitigation by adoption of secure standards
As discussed in Section 3, the connection between two
mail providers can be secured by using TLS, however, the
efficacy hinges on the way domain validation is handled.
All large email providers employ opportunistic SMTPS
or STARTTLS, hence for an active adversary, using TLS
without any domain validation is immediately vulnerable
to packet injection and DNS spoofing attacks. Hence in
our model, this mitigation would not make any difference.
The same holds for the adoption of STARTTLS, which is
also known to be ineffective against active adversaries. We
thus consider the adoption of SMTPS with a) validation of
the server’s domain, and b) validation of both the server’s
domain and the domain part of the email address, i.e.,
according to RFC 7817.
d ∈ Provider
¬nTLS(d) c = $4k
d ∈ Provider
¬nTLS(d) ∧ ¬nRFC7817(d) c = $4 080
Cost estimation. Similar to the adoption of DANE or
SMTP TLS, strict enforcement of TLS should not need
more than 40 working hours by external consultants, i.e.,
40 ∗ 100 = $4 000. The additional running cost imposed by
cryptography are negligible. First, the additional costs for
the record protocol are very cheap [49], second, modern mail
transfer agents support connection sharing, which is very
4. The survey also revealed that some organizations had only small
upgrade costs, because of over-capacities in CPU and storage. By taking the
maximal cost we assume the worst-case, where an infrastructure upgrade
is necessary.
efficient in our setting where a small number of popular mail
providers dominates the market. Third, as about 80% to 90%
of communication enjoys (opportunistic) TLS already, a
relatively small amount of traffic is affected. The implemen-
tation cost of RFC 7817 are the same as for strict certificate
validation, but the certificate format needs to be adapted to
this recent standard, which amounts to about $80 for the
first year. This is only the cost of implementation, which
we can get reliable estimates for. Our results (cf. scenario
S2 in Section 6.2) indicate that strict certificate validation
would have been widely deployed, if these where the only
cost imposed by deployment. However, unless all legitimate
email providers have valid certificates, strict validation will
come at a cost of functionality. Users will not be able to
reach other users on servers with invalid certificates. We
will thus also discuss a model reflecting the loss of revenue
due to users quitting the provider in frustration.
4.5. Mitigation by relocation
If the adversary controls infrastructure used by the de-
fender, e.g., the mail server itself, the only remedy is to set
up trustworthy infrastructure or relocate it to put it under a
different jurisdiction.
e ∈ Dom {d1, · · · , dl} = {d | d DNS−−→ e}
d1 6DNS−−→ e ∧ · · · ∧ dl 6DNS−−→ e
c = $10 000
d ∈ Provider {e1, · · · , el} = {e | d MX−−→ e}
d 6MX−−→ e1 ∧ · · · ∧ d 6MX−−→ el
c = $1 · u(d)
Although politically difficult, it is not completely unlikely
in the context of European privacy law. In October 2015,
following a court decision by the Court of Justice of the
European Union, the safe harbor agreement between the
EU and US was declared invalid on the grounds that the
US was not supplying an equally adequate level of pro-
tection against surveillance for data being transferred there.
A new agreement, the EU-US Privacy shield, was quickly
put in place after this decision, however, the European Data
Protection Supervisor stated in May 2016 that ‘the Privacy
Shield, as it stands, is not robust enough to withstand future
legal scrutiny before the [European] Court’ [50]. We are
excluding authoritative name servers for top-level domains
(TLDs) from relocation, but name servers below can be
relocated, removing all dependencies to the compromised
TLD.
Cost estimation. While relocation cost depend a lot on a
company’s location, we aim for a uniform treatment which
only takes into account the number of users, u(d), a provider
d has, ignoring the difference in cost of running the servers
at the new location, e.g., rent, electricity, insurance, tax, etc.
Planning and executing the relocation amounts to ca.
$10,000 per rack [51]. This gives the cost per name server
relocation. For mail servers, the relocation costs scale with
the users, hence we multiply these cost with the number of
users, as one rack can serve 10k users [52]. As relocation
costs are similar to moving the same infrastructure to a
(trusted) cloud service [53], we do not distinguish the two
scenarios.
5. Data acquisition
In order to evaluate our mitigation analysis, we select
attacker and defender countries we consider relevant. We
use market share data to determine the most popular email
service providers in each defender country. Then we acquire
DNS and routing data to derive the property graph described
in Section 2.3 and instantiate the threat model.
Attacker countries. We have to choose which country is
taking the ‘attacker’ role, but stress that this word is to be
interpreted in the information security sense. We chose the
following criteria to avoid politicising this decision: As we
are interested in countries which are both capable and likely
to engage in large-scale email sniffing, we consider the
purported spending on intelligence services [54], military
spending [55], and the press freedom index [56], the first
two as indicators for the intelligence capabilities, and the
third for the plausibility of such an endeavour.
We consider the seven countries which are both in the
top 10 w.r.t. spending on intelligence and military and, in
addition, in the bottom 140 of the press freedom index.
We also consider the so-called Five Eyes agreement (Aus-
tralia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the
United States) as this alliance is known to engage in email-
sniffing [57] . According to a document leaked by Edward
Snowden, a larger group of countries is officially known as
SIGINT Seniors Europe, or ‘SSEUR’ [58]. This alliance,
consisting of the Five Eyes plus Denmark, France, the
Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain and
Sweden is also known as ‘Fourteen Eyes’. We thus consider
the United States, Japan, China, Russia, Italy, Mexico, South
Korea, having the role of the attacker, as well as Five Eyes
and Fourteen Eyes.
Defender countries & vantage points. We chose defender
countries according to the number of Internet users in the
country. Table 3 shows the nine countries with the most In-
ternet users (in absolute numbers). The Internet as a whole,
and domain resolution in particular, looks different when
observed from different countries, e.g., due to CDNs (e.g.,
DNS-based request-routing [59] [60]), Anycast DNS [61]
and censorship. Unfortunately, we could not get access to
machines in certain countries, therefore we chose to omit
them. This resulted in the selection of: China, USA, Brazil,
Russia and Germany. At each of those vantage points, we
instantiate a new property graph with the data gathered from
the respective server. We furthermore obtained market share
data to evaluate attack impacts and identify the most popular
email service providers in the defender countries, see, e.g.,
Figure 3. or Appendix B.4 for the other countries.
Country Internet users Email Probes Server
China 731 434 547 87% × X
India 462 124 989 68% × ×
United States 286 942 362 88% × X
Brazil 122 796 320 80% × X
Japan 118 131 030 75% × ×
Russia 105 311 724 86% × X
Nigeria 86 436 611 — × ×
Mexico 72 945 992 85% × ×
Germany 70 675 097 89% X X
TABLE 3: Countries by number of Internet users [62], [63].
DNS related data. Our data acquisition starts with DNS
queries for collecting the DNS related informations. DNS
is, in fact, a database that provides lookup information
for different relationships, including domain name to IP
address, email address to an email servers, email server to
an IP address and so on. In our work, we collect the DNS
records relevant to our threat model, namely, A records, i.e.,
mapping domain name to an IP, MX records, i.e., email
transfer agents used by the domain name and NS record,
i.e., authoritative name servers used by that domain. We add
nodes and relationships (see Table 1) corresponding to these
records to the property graph (see Section 2.3). To identify
the local DNS resolver (or the DNS forwarder) used by mail
servers for name resolution, we monitor the inbound traffic
at an external name server, to identify the IP address of the
resolver. To this end, we set up a mail server and added
its domain name as an MX record into our DNS zone file.
Next, we created email accounts with the mail providers
that are part of the analysis and accordingly sent emails
to our mail server. To avoid cached results that the local
DNS resolver/forwarder might have for our domain, we
change the domain name of our mail server for every mail
provider by using a cache-busting nonce: emails are sent to
resolver@x.ourdomain.com, where x is different for
each email. The name server then registers which resolver
requested x.ourdomain.com.
Routing information and countries. To be able to model
AS-level routing attacks and their mitigation, we need rout-
ing data for the ASes where the mail providers and name
servers are hosted. We chose to measure actual routes, rather
than simulating routing policies (e.g., Gao-Rexford) using
public peering information. This improves the accuracy of
our routing data, however, Germany is the only country of
our selection for which we were able to get sufficiently many
probes within these ASes. Our methodology can be easily
adapted to the simulation approach.
For collecting routing information, we start with identi-
fying the ASes of the mail servers by querying the RIPEStat
database [64]. We collect the information about the AS-level
routing between two mail servers using the RIPE Atlas [65]
network of probes to acquire traceroutes between the mail
servers. We thus identify the actual AS-level routes package
between two MTAs would take (within the time frame of
our measurements). However, not all ASes host a RIPE
probe, hence our analyses do not cover all possible pairs
of MTAs. Table 3 indicates where our data was insufficient,
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Figure 3: Most used (primary) email providers in Ger-
many [68].
and hence packet injection capabilities of the attacker were
underestimated.
Finally, in order to establish a relationship between
the servers and the countries where they belong, we add
geolocation data to our property graph. To that end, we
query the MaxMind [66] dataset and accordingly create a
node of type Cntry along with an edge of type LOC that
links the IP address to the selected country.
6. Results and Evaluation
We now apply our methodology for the threat and de-
fender model described in Sections 3 and 4 to the data
acquired in Section 5. First, we consider different cost
scenarios within a case study (Five Eyes versus Germany)
to discuss deployment hazards and the impact of DNSSEC.
Then we discuss the results for all combination of defenders
and attackers we considered in our analysis. We visualize
our results in several figures with a symlog-scaled x-axis
which is linear around 0 and logarithmic o/w, the y-axis
is scaled linearly. Additionally, we release our source code
along with an interactive visualization of the results at [67].
After pre-processing, most of the generated instances could
be solved on an Intel Xeon E5-4650L machine within one
minute. The largest instance required approximately 16 min-
utes of CPU time. The pre-processing time was dominated
by IO operations, and otherwise it was negligible.
6.1. Threats to validity
Provided our formal threat model is correct, we identify
the following threats to validity: as mentioned before, we
consider only direct monetary cost and treat defender cost
uniformly regardless of country and size of company. We
rely on email market share studies to estimate the impact
of an attack. These consider only user’s primary email ad-
dresses. The cost for TLS deployment in S3 to S6 are highly
speculative. Finally, we were only able to measure routes
between ASes for Germany, not for the other countries.
6.2. Case study: Five Eyes versus Germany
We consider the case of the Five Eyes alliance versus
Germany to discuss the effects of large-scale email sniffing
on a market where foreign companies provide plenty of
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Figure 4: Five Eyes vs. Germany (S1)
infrastructure (as opposed to China) but domestic companies
still serve the majority of users (unlike Brazil, see Figure 3).
Germany has a sizeable market of approx. 62.9 million email
users, and it is well covered by RIPE Atlas for collecting
routing information (2114 RIPE Atlas probes, 1056 online
at the time of writing). We obtained 1 332 594 routes, 176 of
which are relevant to this attack scenario. There are three US
companies among the top mail providers in Germany; Mi-
crosoft, Google and AOL. GMX, web.de and 1&1 are part
of the same company and thus share some infrastructure,
e.g., they are within the same autonomous system (AS8560).
These providers are also the only providers which employ
DNSSEC and DANE.
Barring any mitigations, the attacker gets hold of 48
provider to provider connections, representing 45.43% of
German user to user communications. Our exposition will
follow the cost scenarios detailed in Table 4, which we will
motivate as we go along.
S1: Unit cost. In the unit cost scenario, each mitigation has
a cost of 1, hence the defender’s goal is minimizing the num-
ber of measures taken. In this first analysis (see Figure 4), we
observe first that the attacker reward can actually be reduced
to zero by enforcing TLS connections and RFC 7817 on
all providers and relocating outlook.com, aol.de and
gmail.com. As TLS and RFC 7817 validate the identity
and the authority of the recipient MX, no relocation for
name servers is necessary. Relocation is restricted to foreign
mail providers. All other mitigation strategies that result
in zero attacker reward are dominated by this mitigation
strategy, as TLS and RFC 7817 provide a cure-for-all in two
steps, whereas relocation of name servers or VPNs requires
mitigation at several points of the network.
S2: actual spending. Now we consider the actual cost spent
on implementing these mitigations (see Figure 5). Here
again, enforcing TLS and RFC 7817 is the prevalent so-
lution in low-cost and high-security settings. US-based mail
providers are proposed to relocate their MXes. RFC 7817 is
indeed more useful than the relocation of DNS servers. DNS
relocation is rarely considered, as all German providers rely
only on infrastructure within Germany, whereas mail servers
of US providers need to be relocated anyway.
It thus seems that the deployment of TLS with strict
certificate validation according to RFC 7817 is the cheapest
routing mit. DNS mitigations secure standards relocation
scenario VPN DNSSEC DANE/SMTP STS enforce TLS RFC 7817 MX NS
S1: unit cost 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
S2: actual spending 56 000 366 342 4 000 4 000 4 080 1/user 10k
S3: deployment (pessimistic) 56 000 366 342 4 000 4k + cpess /user (disabled) 1/user 10k
S4: deployment (opt.+pess.) 56 000 366 342 4 000 4k + copt /user 4 080+cpess /user 1/user 10k
S5 (a,b): enforce TLS (opt./pess.) 56 000 (disabled) (disabled) 4k + copt/pess /user (disabled) 1/user 10k
S6 (a,b): RFC 7817 (opt./pess.) 56 000 (disabled) (disabled) (disabled) 4 080 + copt/pess /user 1/user 10k
S7: hidden attacker (like S3, but rule rdns−ns has nDNSSEC(n) in its premise)
TABLE 4: cost scenarios: all cost in $. cpess = 0.73 · 7 · 0.5 = 2.555, copt = 0.0036 · 7 · 0.5 = 0.0126.
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Figure 6: Five Eyes vs. Germany (S3 and S4)
way of countering large-scale email sniffing. However, this
contradicts the observation that even despite Google’s and
Facebook’s push for encrypted server to server communica-
tion, no large mail provider dares to require TLS for SMTP
connections.
S3: deployment cost, pessimistic. Opportunity cost is the
main obstacle for enforcing TLS, as users leaving a service
because they cannot reach their friends or business part-
ners produces a loss in revenue.5 We consider the average
revenue per user (ARPU)6. The ARPU for big American
tech companies has increased considerably over the last four
years [69], [70], [71], [72], with google being an outlier
and other companies ranging between $3.50 and $20. We
chose a conservative estimate of $7.00 here. The revenue
generated per user heavily depends on the business model
of the provider and, for providers that are not acting world-
5. While email users are typically not directly profitable for companies,
the service is a way to bind clients to the company.
6. Average margin per user might seem more appropriate, however, it
is difficult to obtain figures on the profit of silicon valley companies.
Moreover, it is very costly to adopt a decrease in users, hence we assume
the cost for infrastructure remains unchanged.
wide, on the local users basis, hence and in-depth analysis
would need to analyse each provider separately. Data from
email marketeers suggests that the revenue third parties
generate from email sent to Gmail differs only slightly from
email sent Yahoo, hotmail or AOL [73], which indicates
that the wealth or willingness to spend money online is not
too different from provider to provider. Nevertheless, the
ARPU is likely to vary from country to country, however,
we assume the ARPU of the big silicon valley companies
is representative for all email providers we investigate, to
have a uniform model.
We make the pessimistic estimate that a provider would
lose 73% of his users when enforcing TLS (SMTPS or
STARTTLS) as opposed to the current opportunistic model.
About half of the users targeted in email marketing are using
web-mail [74]; we presume only those to produce revenue,
as they receive advertisement and are likely to be active on
cloud services. Hence we assume cpess = 0.73 ·$7.50 ·0.5 ≈
$2.56 per user are lost if TLS is enforced.
This number corresponds to the following scenario. Ac-
cording to a long running study by Radicati group, Inc., the
number of business emails sent and received per user per
day totals to 122 emails per day in 2015, among which there
12 spam mails [75]. These numbers are slowly but steadily
increasing despite increased use of IM, chat, social network-
ing and other forms of communication [9]. In Germany, the
number of emails sent is 20 per day [76], which appears
consistent. As of May 2017, Google reports that 88% of
outbound and 86% inbound emails are already passing stan-
dard certificate validation [40], Facebook reported even 95%
percent of notification emails in 2014 [41], Yahoo reported
80% [77]. Taking these numbers as a basis for an average
user, 73% is the probability that this average user gives up,
if she insists that tin = 90% of inbound emails addressed
to her and tout = 70% of her outbound emails reach their
destination.7 If all users were to behave like this average
user, about 0.73% of users would leave a provider.
In this scenario, TLS is altogether avoided as a miti-
gation (see Figure 6). Throughout the Pareto frontier, only
mitigation by relocation appears. The most expensive but
effective mitigation is incurring $15M in cost and requires
relocating four name servers of AOL and the mail servers
of AOL, Microsoft, Google, 1&1 and Arcor, favoring re-
7. We can compute the probability that this average user gives up using
two binomial distributions: pgives up := 1 − Pr[I > tin · nin ] · Pr[O >
tout · nout ], where nin = 100, nout = 20 and I ∼ B(nin , 0.86),
O ∼ B(nout , 0.88).
location over the deployment of TLS. This is consistent
with the observation that, in the wild, TLS connections
are not enforced by mail providers, which is likely because
early adopters would be punished by clients leaving for less
secure but more functional services. It is remarkable that
DANE/SMTP STS never appear in the Pareto frontier – as
in all other scenarios. Upon closer inspection, this is due
the fact that there is only a single route between two MXes
(out of 176 relevant routes) that traverses a compromised
AS, but where DANE/SMTP STS can be of use because
the destination MX is not compromised from the start, e.g.,
domestic. This route connects the MXes of gmx.net, web.de
and 1und1.de (who all belong to United Internet) with t-
online. DANE requires setting up a DNSSEC infrastructure,
but for t-online, this infrastructure is of little other use (in
our model at least), as t-online does not rely on authoritative
name servers controlled by the attacker. Hence it is cheaper
to set up a VPN for this specific route. Naturally, our routing
data is incomplete, but it appears DANE/SMTP STS is
of little use when domestic providers are communicating
via domestic infrastructure. We disabled RFC 7817, since
estimating the cost of its deployment is pure speculation.
(We will indulge in speculation in the next section, though.)
Consequently, even with an unlimited budget, it is not possi-
ble to lower the attacker reward to 0 and 19M transmissions
(of 4.95 · 1015) cannot be considered confidential.
S4: deployment cost, optimistic and pessimistic. We take
a more optimistic view on the deployment obstacles of TLS
enforcement by considering an average user who is perfectly
happy as long as half her incoming emails reach her, and half
her outgoing emails reach their recipient. If every provider’s
user base consisted of only this user, enforcing TLS would
cost a provider 3.6‰ of its user base. For RFC 7817,
we assume the pessimistic scenario, as it is relatively new
(March 2016).
Under these circumstances, enforcing TLS is very useful
even in low-cost scenarios (see Figure 6). Up to a total cost
of $25k, the dominant solution is to enforce TLS with the
largest subset (by market share) of German mail providers
within the budget. Above that, a mix between enforcing TLS
and relocating mail servers and name servers of US mail
providers is the most cost-efficient. Enforcing RFC 7817 is
only gaining interest starting at a $12M budget. Relocating
the mail servers of Microsoft, AOL and Google (but not
1&1 and Arcor, as in S3), the adversarial success can be
reduced to 0 if all remaining providers enforce TLS with
validation according to RFC 7817, however, at the cost of
approx. $156M. This confirms that RFC 7817 validation is
an effective countermeasure, even if it comes at high cost.
S5+S6: the security advantage of deploying RFC 7817.
The results in scenario S3 and S4 suggest the following
question: If one would go through the pain of enforcing
TLS for SMTP traffic, would it not make sense to deploy
RFC 7817 right away? We compare those two scenarios by
disabling one or the other and comparing the results. RFC
7817 is strictly stronger but requires some additional effort
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Figure 8: Five Eyes vs. Germany (S5b and S6b)
at the recipients’ side. It is hard to estimate this cost, but our
comparison gives an indication of the cost saved by other
measures becoming redundant due to RFC 7817’s stronger
resistance against attacks on the DNS level.
In the optimistic scenario (see Figure 7), our data suggest
that not only RFC 7817 is the better mitigation from the
start, but starting from a budget of approx. $4 000, the
attacker reward is consistently 20 percentage points higher if
TLS is enforced (w/o RFC 7817) for the same budget. Again
it is not possible to lower the attacker reward below 19M
connections, whereas validation according to RFC 7817 can
lower it to zero.
In the pessimistic scenario (see Figure 8), however,
there is almost no difference between both Pareto frontiers,
because in both scenarios, relocation of NS servers and IPsec
is preferred to enforcing TLS, be it with or without RFC
7817 certificate validation: TLS is never enforced in the
Pareto frontier to S5b. TLS+RFC 7817 appears in S6b at the
cost of ca. $14M, however, it is only slightly more effective
than the corresponding solution by relocation in S5b.
S7: hidden attacker, crouching DNSSEC. DNSSEC can
also be used as a forensic tool, as signatures permit identify-
ing misbehaving parties and provide a time stamp to indicate
responsible actors [78]. As our motivation is an attacker
who attempts large-scale surveillance without getting caught
too often, it is interesting to look at the scenario where
the integrity of a domain is protected by DNSSEC even
if a name server used during resolution (and thus part of
the trust chain) is controlled by the adversary, because
she is trying to avoid exposure. This amounts to simply
adding nDNSSEC(n) to the premise of rule rdns−ns (see
Appendix A).
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Figure 9: Five Eyes vs. Germany (S4 and S7)
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Figure 10: Results for defender country Germany (S4)
Comparing the Pareto frontier in S4 and S7 (see Fig-
ure 9), we observe no difference from the start, but a
significant increase of confidential connections in the mid-
cost region. The attacker reward is lowered to zero one
order of magnitude earlier. With increasing budget, first
the IPsec connection for the aforementioned route (see S3)
is used, then domestic providers deploy DNSSEC, except
for t-online (which has little dependency on compromised
name servers) and freenet.de (where it is cheaper to relocate
the few name servers they have). As DNSSEC now also
mitigates DNS spoofing via authoritative name servers, it
becomes a cheaper alternative to strict TLS enforcement
at all budgets. This means that DNSSEC is a very cost-
efficient and effective counter-measure against large-scale
email sniffing, provided that the attacker can be held re-
sponsible for misbehavior or has other reasons to avoid
exposure that cannot be denied easily. Again, DNSSEC is
not deployed, as it is cheaper for t-online to secure the single
malicious route via IPsec than to use DANE/SMTP STS and
pay the additional cost of deploying DNSSEC.
6.3. Results for other countries
We now turn our attention to the other defender coun-
tries. For space reasons, we limit the discussion to the fourth
cost scenario (S4), which allows to compare the effect of all
defender actions. Figures 10 to 14 give an combined view
of the respective defender countries against the different
attacker countries. Attacker countries which cannot compro-
mise any email communication of the considered defender
country have been left out, and coalitions are excluding the
defending country.
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Figure 11: Results for defender country Brazil (S4)
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Figure 12: Results for defender country China (S4)
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Figure 13: Results for defender country Russia (S4)
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Figure 14: Results for defender country USA (S4)
Germany. Among the Five Eyes countries, only the US can
affect email confidentiality of German users. In low-cost
scenarios below $56k, enforcing TLS provides a remedy,
above this budget, and up to $151M, securing the connec-
tion between two ASes via IPsec is an effective measure.
To completely defend, it is necessary to relocate the mail
servers of the American providers, and to enforce TLS with
RFC 7817 for all providers to protect from TLD servers
hosted in the USA. Extending the attacker to all Four-
teen Eyes countries leads to additional attacks on domain
resolution, significantly increasing the necessary mitigation
budget. Relocating all compromised mail servers, and en-
forcing TLS with RFC 7817 certificate validation, however,
is still sufficient to protect Germany’s email confidentiality.
Finally, South Korea and Italy are able to compromise
email confidentiality through malicious routes, but only to
marginal success. For South Korea, only DNSSEC and TLS
enforcement appear in the Pareto frontier, for Italy only
relocation and TLS enforcement.
Brazil. According to our statistics, US mail providers en-
tirely dominate the email market of Brazil [79]. Conse-
quently, Brazil has a significant dependency on US infras-
tructure. Relocating mail servers of the less used providers
(yahoo and gmail) along with enforcing TLS with RFC
7817 is the cheapest mitigation strategy. Starting at 68M,
relocating the email servers of hotmail, being by far the
most prominent provider in Brazil, leads to a tremendous
decrease in compromised connections.
China. Only the US and Japan are relevant attacking coun-
tries in this scenario. To mitigate attacks from Japan, it
is enough to relocate a single name server. On the other
hand, to mitigate attacks from the US, the best solution is to
relocate the mail servers of hotmail and to enforce TLS and
RFC 7817 on the domestic providers. Note that DNSSEC
seems irrelevant because we lack information about routing,
and mostly Chinese TLDs are used.
Russia. Apart from gmail.com, Russian users rely on do-
mestic email providers. This is the reason why there is
no country or alliance that can compromise more than ca.
36%. Relevant attackers are the US and Fourteen Eyes. The
only difference between them is that against Fourteen Eyes
a single compromised name server needs to be relocated.
The immediate and the cheapest mitigation is to activate
DNSSEC on the three domestic providers because they use
US controlled TLDs. Further, relocating the email servers
of gmail and activating DNSSEC on only two domestic
providers is a close second. To reach confidentiality for
all communication, it is necessary to enable DNSSEC and
enforce TLS with RFC 7817 on all domestic providers and
to relocate gmail’s email servers.
USA. To defend from other countries which are part of
Five Eyes, it is necessary for the US to relocate a single
name server which resides in the UK. For defending from
the Fourteen Eyes countries, more action is needed. Strictly
speaking, all five widely used domestic email providers
need to enable DNSSEC because some routes are traversing
foreign countries.
7. Related work
Infrastructure analysis on the Internet. Many works have
been studying global and targeted attacks on the Internet
infrastructure and the reasons behind these attacks [80], [81],
[32] but the systematic evaluation of mitigations has largely
been neglected. Frey et al. [82] studied the European BGP
topology w.r.t. to disruption scenarios, but considered only
three possible outcomes from mitigation. Simeonovski et.
al. [32] presented a model of the Internet infrastructure using
property graphs to assess attacker impact, but not possible
mitigations. We extend their property graph for modeling the
Internet infrastructure and adopt a completely new and more
expressive attacker model (adding, e.g., name resolution and
routing).
Automated mitigation analysis. As previously mentioned,
our work builds on the recent proposal by Speicher et al. [8],
introducing automated mitigation analysis in the context
of simulated pentesting, i.e., automated security testing for
corporate networks. Our planning framework, as well as the
associated mitigation analysis algorithms, are extensions of
this work, so some words are in order regarding related
models. Simulated pentesting is rooted in the consideration
of attack graphs, first introduced by Philipps and Swiler
[27]. An attack graph breaks down the space of possible
attacks into atomic components, often referred to as attack
actions. Much as in AI planning, the attack graph is intended
as an analysis of threats that arise through the possible
combinations of these actions. Different variants of attack
graphs provide analyses at different levels of complexity,
ranging from simple threat overviews (e.g., [83], [28]) to a
full state-space verification (e.g., [84], [85]). A prominent
middle ground between the two is the monotonic formu-
lation – positive preconditions and postconditions only –
that we employ here as well, where attackers keep gaining
new assets, but never lose any assets during the course of
the attack [28], [29], [86], [87], [88], [30], [89]. A close
relative of attack graphs are attack trees (e.g., [83], [90]) a
form of ‘Graphical Security Models’ [91]: Directed acyclic
AND/OR graphs organizing known possible attacks into a
top-down refinement hierarchy. The human user writes that
hierarchy, and the computer analyzes how attack costs and
probabilities propagate through the hierarchy.
Mitigation analysis models not only the attacker, but
also the defender. It thus relates to game-theoretic security
models, specifically to Stackelberg competitions, where the
game consists of a single exchange of move and counter-
move. In our setting, each ‘move’ here consists of an entire
(defender- respectively attacker-) action strategy.
The most prominent application of game-theoretic secu-
rity models thus far concerns physical infrastructures and
defenses (e.g., [92]), quite different from the network se-
curity setting. A line of research considers attack-defense
trees (e.g., [93], [91]), extended Graphical Security Models
including defending nodes. Some research considers pen-
testing from a very abstract theoretical perspective [94].
The work most closely related to ours is that by Durkota
et al. [95], [96], [97], [98]. Like our mitigation analysis,
Durkota et al.’s work line considers a Stackelberg formula-
tion of security testing. Like Speicher et al.’s work we build
on, Durkota et al.’s work is placed in the network security
context. Apart from this different application, major differ-
ences lie in the attacker and defender models considered
as part of the game. On the one hand, on the defender’s
side, Durkota et al.’s model is limited to the placement
of honeypots, modeled as additional fake machines added
to the network within pools of equivalent machines in-
distinguishable to the attacker. This is in contrast to our
framework which allows general AI planning defender ac-
tions, in order to be able to model complex infrastructure
modifications. On the other hand, on the attacker’s side,
Durkota et al.’s model is more general than ours. It considers
probabilistic attacker actions, with an execution semantics
where attacker actions refer to machine pools, and a concrete
machine is chosen randomly. The latter is needed to give
meaning to the honeypot placement (if a honeypot happens
to be chosen, the attack is stopped immediately). Such
complexity is not required, however, in our framework,
where deterministic attacker actions suffice for modeling
purposes. Algorithmically, the consequence is that Durkota
et al.’s work focuses on tackling the complexity of attack
planning, while Speicher et al.’s algorithms, that we adopt
here, focus on tackling the complexity of search through the
space of defender-action strategies.
8. Conclusion
We showed that a holistic analysis of deployment bene-
fits of cryptographic protocols, secure configurations and po-
litical measures is possible with a high degree of automation.
Based on a very simple cost assessment in the case of email
communication, we see that the enforcement of TLS would
have a great effect in most countries. If strict TLS validation
can be achieved, RFC 7817 should be implemented with it:
despite its simplicity, it reduces mitigation cost by more
than 20%. However, it is plausible that the hidden cost
of deployment, a loss of functionality, make this approach
impractical. Techniques like DANE and SMTP STS do not
suffer this problem, however, in the case of Five eyes vs
Germany, they are never of use. This might be different
for Russia vs USA and US vs Five eyes, where DNSSEC
is employed a lot, but the lack of routing data prohibits
a conclusion in these cases. DNSSEC itself is particularly
useful in the scenario where the attacker does not tamper
with the trust chain. There it substitutes enforcement of
TLS completely. Such sneaky adversaries should receive
further analysis in the future. Even if the adversary is not
sneaky, DNSSEC is useful when the domestic infrastructure
is relatively self-sufficient, e.g., for Russia and the US in
scenario S4. While the US, Russia and China are relatively
self-sufficient, the privacy of email users in Brazil is highly
vulnerable due to foreign dependencies, requiring costly
relocation.
An interesting avenue for future work is to capture
probabilistic threat model, e.g., off-path attacks on DNS that
succeed only with a certain chance, vulnerability assessment
of old operating systems, or the chance of a user becoming
victim to fishing attacks. Probabilistic planning provides a
fitting framework for this endeavour and could help, e.g.,
to prepare emergency responses to large-scale incidents like
the recent spreading of the WannaCry worm. Furthermore,
the rules defining our threat model are ad-hoc. Similar to
how abstractions of cryptographic primitives in the Dolev-
Yao model are justified via computational soundness, it is
worth exploring how holistic threat models for risk assess-
ment, which have to be somewhat sound and complete, can
be derived from protocol specifications. Most importantly:
precise cost estimates are hard to come by, in particular the
cost induced by loss of functionality and interoperability. We
hope that the methodology presented here encourages the in-
depth analysis and validation of deployment cost, both for
existing and for future security mechanisms.
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Appendix
1. Complete threat model
In this section, we detail the complete threat model
described in Section 3. For brevity, we will use disjunctions
in the pre-condition of rules as a shorthand for two rules,
one for each disjunct. In logical terms, an action is given by
a precondition pre, a boolean formula over proposition liter-
als, and a postcondition post, a conjunction over proposition
literals, and is written as
pre
post.
We will give each rule, followed by the intuition of what
kind of attack it represents.
1.1. Initially Compromised Nodes.
Rule rinit−loc :.
x ∈ AS ∪ IP ∪ Dom cn ∈ Cntry x LOC−−→ n C(cn)
C(x)
Intuition All autonomous systems, IPs and domains
associated to the attacking country are initially under control
of the attacker.
Rule rinit−as :.
i ∈ IP a ∈ AS i ORIG−−−→ a C(a)
C(i)
Intuition If an AS is under the control of the attacker, any IP
which is part of the AS is also under control of the attacker.
Rule rinit−dom :.
d ∈ Dom i ∈ IP d A−→ i C(i)
C(d)
Intuition If an IP is under the control of the attacker,
any domain that resolves to it (even if the attacker cannot
interfere with the resolution), is also under the control of
the attacker.
1.2. Attacks via Routing.
Rule rinjection :.
d,e∈Dom i,j∈IP a,b,c∈AS C(b) nVPN(a,c)
d
A−→i e A−→j i ORIG−−−→a j ORIG−−−→c a RTE(b)−−−−→c
IR(d, e)
Intuition If the attacker controls an AS which transfers
packets from a domain m to some IP address belonging
to n and this particular connection is not secured via the
VPN mitigations, we assume that the integrity of the com-
munication from m ∈ Dom to n ∈ Dom is compromised.
On the resolution and application level we are only
concerned with communication between domains. Thus this
rule covers all relevant routing attacks.
1.3. Integrity of domain/MX resolution.
Rule rdns−ns :.
d, e ∈ Dom d DNS−−→ e C(e)
IDNS(d) (rdns−ns )
Intuition If the attacker controls any name server that could
be queried during resolution, we consider the integrity of the
domain name resolution compromised.
Although unspecified by RFC 3207, name servers com-
monly attach an A record whenever they respond to a
resolution request with an DNS entry pointing to another
name server [4]. This speeds up the resolution and has the
pleasant side-effect that the integrity of the resolution does
not depend on whether these authoritative the integrity of
the resolution of the domain names of the name servers
requested, hence the transitive rule for IDNS is not at the
attacker’s disposal.
Rule rdns−res :.
d, e ∈ Dom i ∈ IP d RSLVR−−−−→ i C(i)
IDNS(d, e)
Intuition If the attacker controls the resolver of a domain,
we consider the integrity of any domain name resolution
this domain attempts compromised. (Technically, r is an IP
address, but we simplified this and the following rule for
presentation.)
Rule rdns−route−res :.
d, e, r ∈ Dom d RSLVR−−−−→ r IR(d, r) nDNSSEC(e)
IDNS(d, e)
Intuition If the attacker controls the route from a domain
to the resolver this domain uses, we consider the integrity
of any domain name resolution this domain attempts com-
promised, unless the integrity of the resolution is guaranteed
by DNSSEC.
Rule rdns−route−ns :.
d,e,f,r∈Dom d RSLVR−−−−→r e DNS−−→f IR(r,f)
nDNSSEC(e)
IDNS(d, e)
Intuition If the attacker controls the route from a resolver
to some authoritative name server potentially queried during
resolution, we consider the integrity of the resolution for
this domain name compromised, unless the integrity of the
resolution is guaranteed by DNSSEC.
1.4. Confidentiality.
Rule rcompromise :.
d, e ∈ Provider d MX−−→ d′ e MX−−→ e′ C(e′) ∨ C(d′)
unconf(d, e)
Intuition If a mail server is already compromised, e.g.,
if it is hosted by an adversarial country, the attacker can
compromise the confidentiality of the communication be-
tween two mail providers.
Rule rfake−mx :.
d,e∈Provider d6=e d MX−−→d′
nTLSsnd(d) IDNS(e)∨IDNS(d′,e)
unconf(d, e)
Intuition If the sender does not enforce strict host vali-
dation, e.g., by using optimistic STARTTLS, the attacker
can compromise the confidentiality of the communication
between two mail providers by changing a provider’s MX
record to point to a domain under her control.
Rule rfake−ip :.
d,e∈Provider d6=e d MX−−→d′ e MX−−→e′
IDNS(e′)∨IDNS(d′,e′) nTLSsnd(d)
unconf(d, e)
Intuition If the sender dos not enforce strict host validation,
e.g., by using optimistic STARTTLS, the attacker can com-
promise the confidentiality of the communication between
two mail providers by pointing the domain of the MX to an
IP of her choice.
Rule rintercept :.
d,e∈Provider d6=e d MX−−→d′ e MX−−→e′
IR(d′,e′) nTLSsnd(d) nDANErcv(e)
unconf(d, e)
Intuition If the sender dos not enforce strict host vali-
dation, e.g., she is using optimistic STARTTLS, and DANE
is not deployed, the attacker can compromise the confiden-
tiality of the communication between two mail providers by
intercepting packets on the route between their respective
mail servers.
Rule rfake−mx−strict :.
d,e∈Provider d6=e d MX−−→d′
IDNS(e)∨IDNS(d′,e) nRFC7817(d)
unconf(d, e)
Intuition If the sender dos not enforce certificate val-
idation according to RFC 7817, e.g., by using optimistic
STARTTLS or strict validation on the hostname only, the
attacker can compromise the confidentiality of the communi-
cation between two mail providers by changing a provider’s
MX record to point to a domain under her control.
2. Complete defender model
In this section, we detail the complete defender actions
described in Section 4.
2.1. Routing mitigation.
a, b ∈ AS a, b LOC−−→ cnD
¬nVPN(a, b) c = $56 000
Intuition The connection between any two AS, adjacent
or not, can be secured by deploying a VPN, provided the
AS is under the jurisdiction of the defending country cnD .
2.2. DNS-level mitigations.
f∈Provider
{d1,...,dl}={d∈Dom|d
DNS−−→e∧f NS−→e}
¬nDNSSEC(d1) ∧ · · · ∧ ¬nDNSSEC(dl) c = $366 342
Intuition A mail provider can deploy DNSSEC on all
domains below any authoritative name server for the domain
that identifies him for a fixed price. Below is interpreted
with respect to the DNS hierarchy, every domain whose
resolution depends on such an authoritative name server is
considered ‘below‘.
f ∈ Provider d DNS−−→ e f NS−→ e ¬nDNSSEC(d)
¬nDANErcv(f) c = $4 000
Intuition For all domains below any authoritative name
server for a domain that identifies a provider, if this domain
supports DNSSEC already, it can also deploy DANE/SMTP
STS.
2.3. Mitigation by adoption of secure standards.
d ∈ Provider
¬nTLS(d) c = $4 000
Intuition Spending cost for TLS with strict certificate
validation.
d ∈ Provider
¬nTLS(d) ∧ ¬nRFC7817(d) c = $4 080
Intuition Spending cost for TLS with strict certificate
validation according to RFC 7817, additional cost for new
certificates.
2.4. Mitigation by relocation.
e ∈ Dom {d1, · · · , dl} = {d | d DNS−−→ e}
d1 6DNS−−→ e ∧ · · · ∧ dl 6DNS−−→ e
c = $10 000
Intuition For a fixed price, a name server can be relo-
cated, removing all dependencies on this name server.
d ∈ Provider {e1, · · · , el} = {e | d MX−−→ e}
d 6MX−−→ e1 ∧ · · · ∧ d 6MX−−→ el
c = $1 · u(d)
Intuition For a price that scales with the number of
users, a mail server can be relocated, removing all depen-
dencies on this mail server. In this section we list the most
popular email providers (Figure 15 - Figure 18) by country
based on the market share they possess.
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Figure 15: Most used (primary) email providers in
China [99]
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Figure 16: Most used (primary) email providers in
USA [100]
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Figure 17: Most used (primary) email providers in
Brazil [79]
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Figure 18: Most used (primary) email providers in Rus-
sia [101]
